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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
upon an act of defilement, Judge Fuld's position that corroborating evidence
should be required appears correct. 52
"OTHER EVIDENCE" REQUIRED TO CORROBORATE COMPLAINANT'S TESTIMONY
IN RAPE CASE
A defendant charged with rape cannot be convicted upon the testimony of
the person defiled without "other evidence,"53 which tends to establish that
the crime was committed by this defendant.54
Where the commission of rape is proved, the Court of Appeals has
rejected the contention that the "other evidence" required must independently
establish that defendant committed the crime.5 5 People v. Masse,56 declares
the present rule to be, given the establishment of the crime, that almost any
otler evidence is sufficient to corroborate complainant's testimony and sustain
a conviction.
In the Masse case complainant voluntarily told her parents that she had
been raped, only hours before, by the defendant and two others. Medical evi-
dence obtained shortly thereafter established the commission of the act.57 At
the trial complainant testified that in resisting she threw a jewelry box through
a bedroom window. The Court held that the medical evidence, coupled with
evidence that the bedroom window screen was broken, and an eyewitness'
testimony that defendant came out of the house and retrieved a jewelry box,
constituted sufficient "other evidence" to corroborate complainant's testimony
and sustain a conviction.
The cases generally divide into two situations: (1) defendant had an
opportunity to commit the crime, but there is no independent proof that the
crime was committed, and (2) defendant had on opportunity to commit the
crime, and there is independent proof that the crime was committed.
In the absence of proof that the crime has been committed by someone,
a conviction is indeed difficult to obtain.58
Where the commission of the crime is established, defendant's false denial
that he was with complainant at about the alleged time of the act not only
52. People v. Masse, 5 N.Y.2d 217, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1959), noted elsewhere in this
issue, also deals with the rule requiring corroborating evidence to sustain a sex offense
conviction.
53. N.Y. Pm. LAW § 2013. The statute embodies the common law rule of evidence.
People v. Friedman, 139 App. Div. 795, 124 N.Y. Supp. 521 (2d Dep't 1910).
54. People v. Terwilliger, 142 N.Y. 629, 37 N.E. 565 (1893).
55. People v. Masse, 5 N.Y.2d 217, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1959).
56. Ibid.
57 Although defendant argued on appeal that the medical evidence was insufficient
to prove the commission of the act by someone, the Court assumed the contrary position
in its decision.
58. People v. Murray, 183 App. Div. 468, 170 N.Y. Supp. 873 (2d Dep't 1918);
People v. Croes, 285 N.Y. 279, 34 N.E.2d 320 (1941); People v. Anthony, 293 N.Y. 649,
59 N.E.2d 637 (1944); People v. Brehm, 218 App. Div. 266, 218 N.Y. Supp. 469 (2d Dep't
1926); People v. Kingsley, 166 App. Div. 320, 151 N.Y. Supp. 980 (3d Dep't 1915);
People v. Downs, 236 N.Y. 306, 140 N.E. 706 (1923); People v. Page, 162 N.Y. 272, 56
N.E. 750 (1900); People v. Seaman, 152 App. Div. 495, 137 N.Y. Supp. 294 (2d Dep't
1912); People v. Kline, 152 App. Div. 438, 137 N.Y. Supp. 296 (2d Dep't 1912).
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justifies an inference of guilty presence but guilt of the particular crime.00 In
such a situation, it is also error to exclude evidence that someone else also had
intercourse with complainant at about the same time, if that evidence might
impair the probative force of the medical proof.0°
People v. Terwilliger,"' People v. Shaw,62 and People v. Marshall"0 illus-
trate the relationship between the "other evidence" required and complain-
ant's testimony where the commission of the crime is proved and defendant's
opportunity is established. In the Terwilliger case complainant promptly and
voluntarily disclosed the act. Her disheveled and distraught condition and
her statement that she lost an undergarment button in an isolated area where
defendant and she had traveled on the night of the alleged act were held suffi-
cient "other evidence" to sustain a conviction upon the finding of the missing
button. But complainant's disheveled and distraught condition and traces of
gonococci common to both complainant and defendant were not sufficient to
sustain the "other evidence" requirement in the Shaw case,04 where complain-
ant's disclosure was delayed and her testimony in part contradictory. In the
Marshall case complainant testified that she was forcibly carried into de-
fendant's automobile after she had attempted to escape from him, and in so
doing, broke her leg. She testified further that defendant tied a rag around
her bleeding leg and used a knife to coerce her. Defendant admitted that he
drove an automobile that night matching the description given by complainant.
An examination of the automobile disclosed a matching rag, a knife on the
floor, and bloodstains on the back seat. This evidence was held sufficient to
corroborate complainant's testimony and sustain the conviction.
Only in the Marshall case can it be contended that the "other evidence"
independently proved that defendant was guilty. The other above cases
establish that the corroborating evidence required need only support com-
plainant's testimony once the commission of the crime is proved. Complain-
ant's character, 5 the voluntary nature, promptness, and credibility of her
testimony, as a comparison of the Terwilliger and Shaw cases illustrate, effec-
tively dictate the reliance to be placed on this "other evidence." The problem,
as counsels' briefs suggest, is that while the People cannot be required to
furnish an eyewitness to the crime, neither should a defendant be convicted
merely because he might have been guilty. This decision, however, in allowing
almost any other evidence to suffice, so weakens the spirit of the evidentiary
59. People v. Deitsch, 237 N.Y. 300, 142 N.E. 670 (1923). Cf. People v. Croes, supra
note 58.
60. People v. Brehm, supra note 58; People v. Oathout, 240 App. Div. 739, 265 N.Y.
Supp. 535 (3d Dep't 1933).
61. Supra note 54.
62. 158 App. Div. 146, 142 N.Y.S.2d 782 (3d Dep't 1913).
63. 5 A.D.2d 352, 172 N.Y.S.2d 237 (3d Dep't 1958).
64. The female defiled in the Shaw case was 8 yrs. old. Note the following excerpt
from Holt and McIntosh, DIsnAsas OF INFANCY AND CHLDHOOD (11th ed.,) at 821:
"Gonococcus vaginitis is not to be regarded as a venereal disease (in young girls).
An insignificantly small proportion of the cases are acquired by sex contact."
65. See dissent in People v. Kline, supra note 58.
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rule that serious doubt remains whether the protection hitherto afforded by
the rule still remains.
ADmISSION OF EVIDENCE OF CRIME NOT CHARGED IN INDICTMENT
Upon the trial of one crime evidence of the commission of another crime
not charged in the indictment is generally inadmissible. 6 However, exceptions
have been made to admit such evidence under certain circumstances. 67 In
People v. Cohen6 s the defendant was convicted on several counts of insurance
fraud and larceny by false representations with respect to two different fires,6 9
the first of which occurred in Pennsylvania, the second in New York. The
Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division,7" and held that the trial
court had not erred in admitting evidence showing that the cause of the
first fire was the defendant's incendiarism, even though such evidence tended
to prove the crime of arson, which was not charged in the indictment.
The Court held the evidence of arson admissible with respect to the crimes
involving the first fire because it was introduced naturally and incidentally to
the showing of facts and because it showed the falsity of defendant's statement
in his insurance claim (that he did not know the cause of the fire), which
showing evidenced his misrepresentations and his intent to defraud. The evi-
dence of arson in the first fire would not have been admissible to prove the
charges with respect to the second fire, but the Court held that since that
evidence was properly admitted with respect to the first fire and counsel for the
defendant had failed to object to its admission with respect to the second fire,
the objection could not be raised for the first time on appeal.71
People v. Molineux72 and People v. Katz73 are the leading New York
cases dealing with exceptions to the general rule on admission of evidence of
an uncharged crime. Among the exceptions set forth in those cases is one
concerned with the situation in which proof of the uncharged crime is relevant
to the instant crime because it tends to show defendant's intent or a common
scheme or plan.74 This exception has been allowed in trials for uttering counter-
66. People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319 (1887); Coleman v. People, 55 N.Y.
81 (1873); People v. Shea, 147 N.Y. 78, 41 N.E. 505 (1895).
67. The exceptions to the rule cannot be stated with categorical precision.
Generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the
specific crime charged when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent;
(3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) . common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other
that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the
person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. (Wharton on
Crim. Ev. [9th ed.] sec. 48) ...
People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286, 294, 62 L.RA. 193, 240 (1901).
68. 5 N.Y.2d 282, 184 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1959).
69. N.Y. PExr. LAw, §§ 1202, 1290, 1294.
70. People v. Cohen, 4 A.D.2d 557, 172 N.Y.S.2d 575 (4th Dep't 1957).
71. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 446.
72. People v. Molineux, sura note 67.
73. People v. Katz, 209 N.Y. 311, 103 N.E. 305 (1913); see also People v. Thau,
219 N.Y. 39, 113 N.E. 556 (1916) ; People v. Buchar, 289 N.Y. 181, 45 N.E.2d 225 (1942).
74. People v. Molineux, supra note 67.
